Stative verbs provide major challenges both for linguistic semantics and for ontology. On the common, Davidsonian view of the semantics of verbs, verbs take events as implicit arguments and adverbial modifiers (at least to an extent) act as predicates of such event arguments. This approach should naturally extend to stative verbs, which will then take a state as an implicit argument. However, stative verbs do not behave as one might expect on such a Davidsonian view: they for the most part allow only for a very limited set of adverbial modifiers and exclude a ranger of modifiers that express properties of the sort of state that stative verbs appear to describe. For example the stative verb resemble does not allow for location modifiers, even though one might expect a state of resemblance to have as its location the location of its participants:
Stative verbs provide major challenges both for linguistic semantics and for ontology. On the common, Davidsonian view of the semantics of verbs, verbs take events as implicit arguments and adverbial modifiers (at least to an extent) act as predicates of such event arguments. This approach should naturally extend to stative verbs, which will then take a state as an implicit argument. However, stative verbs do not behave as one might expect on such a Davidsonian view: they for the most part allow only for a very limited set of adverbial modifiers and exclude a ranger of modifiers that express properties of the sort of state that stative verbs appear to describe. For example the stative verb resemble does not allow for location modifiers, even though one might expect a state of resemblance to have as its location the location of its participants:
(1) a. * John resembles Mary in France.
Stative verbs, moreover, generally cannot form an infinitival complement of a perception verb, unlike eventive verbs:
(1) b.* Bill saw John resemble Mary.
c. Bill saw John hit Mary.
Thus, unlike events, states for the most part are unable to act as the object of direct perception.
manner modifiers:
(4) a. * John weighs 100 kilos with difficulty.
b. * John owns the horse with effort.
c. ?? John knows French in an unusual way.
(5) a. John was walking in an unusual away.
b. John stood at the table with difficulty.
instrumentals, comitatives:
(6) a. ?? John knows French with Mary.
b. ?? John owns the house with a pencil.
(7) a. John was walking with Sue.
b. John was standing at the table with Sue.
Apparent exceptions to the Stative Adverb Gap generally can be traced to a different semantic interpretation of the adverbial and sometimes a different syntactic function in which the adverbial acts. In particular, an adverbial may be interpreted as a predicate of an event or object associated with the state described, rather than the state itself, as discussed by Katz (2003) and Maienborn (2005) . For example, with great passion in (8a) arguably is predicated of the activities associated with the state of John's having been a catholic, rather than the state itself (Katz 2003) :
(8) a. John was a catholic with great passion in his youth.
Furthermore location adverbials may in sentence-initial position as below act as frame adverbials, specifying the thematic or spatio-temporal frame for the topic the entire subsequent sentence is about (Maienborn 2001 By contrast, eventive and concrete state verbs do admit a time-related interpretation, or rather an interpretation relating to the amount of the activity described:
(10) a. John slept more than May.
b. John walked a little.
c. John spoke French more than Mary.
Finally, abstract-state verbs, unlike concrete-state verbs, cannot form infinitival complements of perception verbs (Maienborn 2005 (Maienborn , 2007 :
(11) a. * John saw Bill weigh 100 kilo.
b. * John saw Bill own the house.
c. * Mary saw John resemble his father.
d. * Mary heard John know French.
There are a number of verbs that allow for an eventive and an abstract-state interpretation and thus pattern in both ways, for example surround, obstruct, depress, help or threaten (Rothmayr 2009 ).
A particular interesting class of abstract-state predicates consists in the combination copula be+ adjective, for short be+A. Maienborn (2005 Maienborn ( , 2007 observes that be+A satisfies all the relevant criteria for abstract-state predicates: they resist the relevant classes of modifiers and they cannot form infinitival complements of perception verbs: 4 (12) a.*John was hungry in front of the refrigerator.
b. ?? John was nervous in Munich.
(13) * John was nervous with trembling hands.
(14) ?? John was strong with Mary.
(15) a. * Mary saw John be hungry.
b. * Mary saw Sue be beautiful.
Two approaches have been proposed in the semantic literature to account for the Stative Adverb Gap: a semantic and an ontological one. Katz (2003) , taking the semantic approach, argued that abstract-state verbs lack an event argument position entirely. This means that there would just be no entity for adverbial modifiers or perception verbs to apply to. By contrast, Maienborn (2005 Maienborn ( , 2007 (Maienborn 2005 (Maienborn , 2007 :
(16) a. Abstract states cannot vary in the way they are realized (which means they cannot be more specific than the descriptive content of the description used to describe them).
b. Abstract states are not accessible to direct perception and have no location in space.
c. Abstract are accessible to higher cognitive operations.
d. Abstract states can be located in time.
original semantic role of specifying the location of the event/state argument of the predicate to one specifying the trigger of the psychological state.
I will add a fourth property that I take to be essential to abstract states, namely the absence of a part-whole structure and of a measurable extent:
(17) Abstract states do not have a part-whole structure, and they do not have a measurable extent.
If abstract states are entities with such characteristics, the behavior of abstract-state verbs with the different sorts of adverbials and perception verbs is straightforwardly explained. Manner adverbials and instrumentals relate to a particular realization of an entity and thus cannot apply to abstract states (which cannot be more specific than the content of the predicate used to refer to them). 
Kimean and Davidsonian conceptions of events
Maienborn's appeal to a Kimean conception of events remains a bit suggestive: it has yet to be shown why exactly on a Kimean account abstract states will have just the kinds of properties they are meant to have. To address this question, let us first review Kim's original account of events. Kim's account consists in stating identify and existence conditions for events, as entities obtained from a property, an object, and a time, by a function f as below:
(19) a. For a property P, an object o, and a time t, the event f(P, o, t) exists iff P holds of o at t.
b. For properties P and P', objects o and o', and times t and t', if f(P, o, t) and f(P', o', t') exist, then f(P, o, t) = f(P', o', t') iff P = P', o = o', t = t'.
This account does not explicitly define events in terms of a property, an object, and a time.
Rather it gives an implicit definition of events, stating their existence and identity conditions in terms of an object, a property, and a time. In particular, events are not taken to be composed in some way of properties, objects, and times. Kim's account in fact introduces events by a form of Fregean abstraction (Frege 1884 , see also Wright 1983 and Hale 1987 ).
Frege's abstraction principle below just gives identity conditions for objects obtained by the abstraction function g from entities o and o' that stand in some equivalence relation:
Thus, for Frege directions are entities introduced by abstraction from parallel lines, and natural numbers entities obtained by abstraction from concepts standing in a one-to-one correspondence. (20) can naturally be generalized to n-place abstraction functions applying to n objects that stand in respective equivalence relations to each other:
Taking the equivalence relations to in fact be the identity relation, (19b) will come out as a special instance of (21). On Kim's view, the property, the object, and the time that introduce an event are given by the description used to describe the event. Thus, Kimean events are strictly dependent for their identity on the event description that is used.
What is particular about Fregean abstraction is that it introduces an object by simply specifying some of its properties, in particular its identity conditions. The object so introduced then could not have any other properties than are logically derivable by what is specified by the abstraction principle, though of course it can be the object of mental attitudes.
As a consequence, Kim's account won't allow events to have the properties that concrete objects have, such as a spatial location or a particular realization, or to be the object of direct perception.
For this reason it is generally agreed that Kim's account in fact defines facts rather than events (Steward 1997) . 5 Facts do not have a spatial location, do not act as objects of (direct) perception, and, arguably do not enter causal relations (but only relations of causal explanation (Steward 1997) ). Moreover, they cannot be more specific than the content of the corresponding canonical fact description, that is, a description of the form the fact that S, where, in the simple case, S provides the property, the object and the time. Facts, though, can be the objects of cognitive attitudes such as being aware of, thinking about, or noticing.
Kim's account is also suited as an account of abstract states. States, unlike facts, though, have a duration and can be 'at' a time. This can be captured by taking states to be obtained only from a property and an object, and not a time, and by making the existence condition of states dependent on a time:
(22) A Kimean account of states:
a. For a property P, an object o, the state s(P, o) obtains at a time t iff P holds of o at t.
b. For properties P and P', objects o and o', and times t and t',
It is a consequence of this implicit definition of abstract states that abstract states will have temporal, but no spatial properties. Moreover, like facts, abstract states will not involve a particular realization, but will be strictly dependent on the property and object given by the state description.
Existence predicates in natural languages give further support for the ontological closeness between facts and abstract states. Thus the existence predicate obtain in English specifically applies to facts and states; is cannot apply to objects or events (for which there are the existence predicates exist and occur instead).
The Kimean account of abstract states in (22) explains the Stative Adverb Gap straightforwardly. The account leaves no space for a spatial location, causal relations, a more specific realization, a part-whole structure, or a measureable extent.
Tropes and abstract states
Abstract states are thus fundamentally distinct from events as well as concrete states (should there be any -I will address that question shortly b. * John has more being wise than Mary.
In fact, tropes as referents of gradable adjective nominalizations generally come with an intrinsic ordering, reflecting the 'degree' to which they exhibit the property in question or some other measureable extent. 9 States, by contrast, come with no such ordering. This is reflected not only in the applicability of amount quantifiers, but also in the applicability of comparative predicates such as exceed or is greater than:
(29) a. John's happiness exceeds / is greater than Mary's.
b. * John's being happy exceeds / is greater than Mary's being happy.
Given the nature of tropes and their semantic role in the semantics of adjectives, the question is, how do tropes relate to concrete states? Should concrete states be identified with tropes or should they be distinguished from them as a separate ontological category? I will only briefly address this question at the end of this paper. I will first turn to a simpler question that tropes as implicit arguments of adjectives raise, namely the question of the semantics of copula constructions of the sort be+A.
Be+adjective
We have seen that be+A counts as an abstract-state predicate regardless of the content of the adjective A. If adjectives take tropes as implicit arguments, this means that the implicit trope argument of the adjective does not act as the implicit argument of the copula verb. The abstract state argument of be+A, however, can be obtained from the implicit trope argument of the adjective, namely as the state of being a bearer of a trope that is an argument of the adjective. Thus, the semantics of be+A will be as below, where 'B' stands for the bearerhood relation, the relation that holds between a trope and its bearer, and f is, as before, the state 
This means that the abstract state argument is completely redundant: it just reifies the content of the predicative complement. Within the trope-based semantics of adjectives, the state argument of be+A is not quite as redundant: it reifies the relation of the subject referent to a particular trope, not the content of the adjective as such. We will see later with the predicate exist that the abstract state predicate may be obtained not just from the property expressed by the predicate, but the conceptual content of the predicate together with another implicit or explicit argument of the predicate.
The concreteness of events
For Maienborn, abstract states are fundamentally different from events, and their lack of a location and a particular realization is entirely independent of any conceptual content associated with the stative predicate or the nature of one particular state as opposed to another. The opposite view has been taken by Doelling (2005) another from the existence predicates exist and occur.
1. Become+adjective
While be+A is an abstract state predicate, become+A obviously is an event predicate. The crucial observation in the present context is that become+A generally describes concrete events. This is remarkable because become+A differs in conceptual content from be+A only in that it describes a transition from a state of not being A to a state of being A.
Unlike with be+A, with become+A location and manner adverbials are perfectly 
Predicates of existence
Predicates of existence, in particular the two existence predicates exist and occur, make a similar point about the concreteness of events. A few words, though, are first needed concerning existence predicates as such. Despite a philosophical tradition that denies that existence is a (first-order) property, natural language displays a range of existence predicates which obviously express at least a formal first-order property (since they generally go along with singular terms):
(37) a. The French president exists.
b. The king of France does not exist.
A number of philosophers have more recently defended the view that exist with a singular term in subject position is a first-order predicate (Miller 1975 , Salmon 1987 , McGinn 2000 .
But its content has generally been taken to be a simple one: exist is true of actually existing objects and false if the subject either does not refer or else stands for a merely intentional or 'nonexisting' entity. It appears, though, that at least tensed exist has a more specific timerelated meaning. This is first of all apparent in a particular semantic selectional restriction that tensed exist exhibits: tensed exist is applicable only to entities that are not events, that is, it is applicable only to enduring, not perduring objects. There are instead specific existence predicates for events, such as occur, take place, or happen:
(38) a. * The murder existed this morning.
b. The murder occurred / took place / happened this morning.
In the following, I will restrict myself to occur.
A further semantic difference between exist and occur consists in their actionsart. Exist is a stative predicate, whereas occur is an eventive predicate. One indication of the stativity of exist is the nominalization existence. 'The existence of the building' is a state; it cannot have typical event properties such as 'being sudden', 'being fast', or 'being quick'. Another indication for the stativity of exist is its inability to take the progressive:
(39) * The house has been existing for a while.
The behavior of adverbial modifiers clearly shows that exist classifies as an abstract state verb. Below we see that exist does not take location modifiers: 10 (40) a. * The French president exists in France.
10 Location modifiers are possible, though, in exist-sentences with bare mass nouns or plurals in subject position:
(i) Giraffes exist / Wildlife exists not only in Africa.
Here exist expresses location-relative existence (Fine 2006) . Perduring objects cannot have location-relative existence, but kinds arguably can.
b. * The box exists on the shelf.
c. * Mao does not exist in China anymore.
To make the point, it is important to understand the sense in which exist does not permit location modifiers. There are in principle two ways in which location modifiers may function:
as adjuncts and as arguments. The common view is that in the former case, the modifiers will act semantically as a predicate of the event argument of the verb, where in the latter case they provide an argument of the relation expressed by the verb. Certainly for identifying a predicate as an abstract state predicate, only the former function will be relevant. Since adverbial modifiers in that function are available without having to be selected by the verb, the location modifiers as adjuncts are available syntactically, but they are excluded for semantic reasons.
Just considering the kind of state that exist should describe, it is not obvious why it should resist location predicates: the existence of an entity d should be a state whose location may seem straightforward: it is located just where d is located. But such reasoning fails. A state of existence resists location predicates rather because it is an abstract state, which by nature does not have such properties as a location in space.
Further evidence that exist is an abstract state predicate is its failure to take manner adverbials and to form an infinitival complement of a perception verb:
(41) a. ?? The president of Italy exists in a flamboyant way.
b. ?? The building exists unnoticed.
(42) * John saw the building exist last year.
What is it about the lexical meaning of exist that makes exist counts as an abstract state verb? The restriction of exist to enduring objects motivates an account of its lexical meaning based on a common philosophical view of endurance: an enduring object d exists at a time t just in case d is wholly present at each moment of t, where 'being wholly present at t' means each part of the object is present at t (Hawley 2007) . Given that (non-minimal) events have temporal parts, events cannot endure, that is, be wholly present at each moment of their duration. In first approximation, the lexical meaning of exist can be given as follows:
(43) For a world w, an entity x that cannot have temporal parts, and an interval t, <e, x> ∈
[exist] w,t iff e consists in the presence of (the whole of) x in w at t' for any subinterval t' of t.
More formally, the event argument of exist can be obtained by abstraction from the timerelative property in (45a), so that we will have (44b) (with 'AT' standing for the relation 'being temporally at'):
Note that this means that the abstract state argument of exist does not reify the lexical content of exist as a one-place predicate, but rather a two-place property involving an implicit temporal restriction.
Let us then turn to the existence predicate occur. Occur like other existence predicates for events (take place, and happen) is an eventive verb. It displays standard diagnostics for eventive predicates, such as allowing for the progressive:
(45) The protest is taking place / is happening / is occurring right now.
Moreover, the corresponding nominalizations clearly refer to events, allowing for typical event predicates: T(e 2 , λx[AT(x, t 2 )], …) and e 1 , e 2 , … are relevant parts of e, with t 1 , t 2 , … respectively as their duration.
The contrast between exist and occur shows once more the fundamental ontological difference between abstract states and events. Exist and occur are both existence predicates, with occur hardly richer in conceptual content than exist. But occur is an eventive predicate and as such it describes concrete events, unlike exist, which is a stative predicate and in fact an abstract state predicate.
11 There is of course the question what a transition is, in particular whether it is itself a relational trope. I address that question in greater detail in Moltmann (forthcoming).
Abstract states, tropes, and the lexical meaning of verbs
The fundamental ontological distinction between abstract states on the one hand and events and tropes on the other hand raises two important questions which I can address only briefly.
First, why should a verb take an abstract state as argument rather than an event or a trope?
That is, does taking an abstract state argument follow from the conceptual content of verbs as such or from the particular conceptual content of a given verb? Second, given the nature and the semantic role of tropes, is a distinction between concrete states and tropes needed or is the category of concrete states dispensable in favor of tropes?
I will touch upon the first question with only a few remarks. An alternative analysis to pursue would be to take degree modifiers to act as predicates of tropes that are not the implicit arguments of the verb, but rather are just associated with the states described by the verb. This of course requires a general account of why some adverbials may apply to the associated trope rather than the implicit state argument of the verb.
The question of concrete states
There is also a general question about the need for concrete-state arguments, as a category apart from abstract states and events. Rothmayr (2009) 
